RESEARCH ARTICLE

IDENTITY STRUGGLE WITHIN THE GRIP OF THE "OTHER": ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

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Deeply rooted in historical, political, and cultural dimensions, the Israel-Palestine conflict is a prolonged and multifaceted struggle that reflects significant disagreements over territory, identity, and power. The paper explores the complex nature of the conflict by looking at the ways that political decisions, historical occurrences, and cultural concepts have influenced Israeli and Palestinian identities and narratives. Constructed through language, symbols, and historical narratives, identity is fundamental in determining attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions. Both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have created unique identities for themselves, frequently stemming from territorial claims and historical grievances. These identity formations have been significantly impacted by Israel's establishment in 1948 and subsequent territorial expansions, such as those that followed the 1967 Six-Day War. While Israelis have been encouraged to pursue notions of security and national fulfillment, Palestinians have been fueled by narratives of displacement and resistance. Since both Israelis and Palestinians have constructed each other as adversaries and frequently use historical narratives and cultural symbols to support their claims to territory and identity, the concept of the "other" became crucial to this approach. The sociopolitical and economic divide that exists between Palestinian Arabs residing in Israel's borders, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip further draws attention to the complexity of the conflict.

Introduction

The establishment of Israel in 1948 and the territorial losses experienced by the Palestinians profoundly influenced the power dynamics between the parties involved in the conflict in the political, economic, and cultural realms. Understanding the identity struggle between Palestine and Israel necessitates addressing the political structures, economic changes, and cultural hegemony of the period following Israel's establishment. The identities of the regional peoples and the impact of these identities' transformation on the conflict are crucial for comprehending and analyzing the evolution of the conflict.

The rise of Zionism, the impact of anti-Semitism, and demographic changes have led to the positioning of the parties as "others" to each other. Efforts to construct cultural identities between Palestinian Arabs and Israelis have been shaped through language, symbols, and historical narratives. The struggle for cultural hegemony between the parties carries the effects of the immediate post-establishment period of Israel and constitutes one of the factors deepening the conflict. The concept of the "other," one of the most significant expressions introduced by postcolonial theory, and thus postcolonial theory itself, serves as a useful framework for explaining how this struggle shaped and became one of the fundamental dynamics of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The land struggle occupies a central position in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the postcolonial theory's perspective on identity and the term "other" is crucial for explaining the connection between this struggle and the postcolonial aspects of the conflict. Israel's territorial gains following events extending from the Six-Day War to the present impacted Palestinian identity and deepened the struggle for sovereignty. The land claims and sovereignty struggles possess characteristics indicating the postcolonial dimensions of the conflict. Israel's territorial advances have worsened the conflict and affected how Palestinians have formed their identities as a result of their traumas. This demonstrates how important the land disputes are in terms of identity and meaning in the Israel-Palestine conflict, alongside being an issue regarding physical boundaries.

The Background of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

The roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict stem from the aftermath of World War I, during which the Ottoman Empire lost its control over the region, leading to increased British influence in the area and the subsequent establishment of a mandate regime in Palestine at the San Remo Conference in 1920. Following these developments, a kind of unified political structure encompassing both Jews and Arabs in Palestine emerged for the first time. These developments sparked initial efforts in the region. Jews began to purchase significant amounts of land in the area, thanks to American-funded initiatives. Subsequently, there were several periods of Jewish migrations to the region. These developments were escalating tensions between Arabs and Israelis. Afterward, during the Arab-Israeli wars, both Israel's strong attacks and the divergent interests of Arab states in Palestinian territories further increased Israel's influence in the region, deepening the Palestine-Israel conflict. Following the Six-Day War in 1967, the influence of Pan-Arabism began to wane in the region, while local nationalist movements such as Pan-Islamism and Palestinian nationalism and socialism gained momentum (Atmaca & Süer, 2007).

The Yom Kippur War, which broke out in 1973, had two main differences from previous Arab-Israeli wars. Firstly, initiated by Egypt, the aim of this war was not to wipe Israel off the map, as before, but to regain the territories lost in the 1967 war. This evolution from the Arab perspective was a turning point both in their positioning of Israel and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The other difference was that, unlike the wars initiated by Israel in 1956 and 1967, this war was not initiated by Israel; instead, the Arabs launched a surprise attack, leading to greater losses for Israel compared to previous wars (Armaoğlu, 1991). Consequently, Israel had to redesign its security perception in the Middle East, and it was realized that Israel could be harmed from the Palestinian perspective. This war and its aftermath contributed to the emergence of the Intifada movements as Palestinians began to believe in their potential.

Halliday (2008) emphasizes that the mentioned Palestinian nationalism is claimed to be an artificial nationalism created by Arab states and manipulated by them to exert pressure on Israel. While disregarding the impact of this claim on the diplomacy of the Palestinian issue before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 would be incorrect, the content and tone of Palestinian nationalism are determined not by Arab states but by Israel's actions hindering the statehood of Palestine.

Throughout history, Israel-Palestine relations have demonstrated a multifaceted and complicated pattern. It is crucial to look back at the rise of Zionism and the 1947 UN plan for the partition of Palestine to comprehend the roots of this war. The Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the growth of Zionism have profoundly disrupted Palestine's social, political, and demographic structures. The conflict between Arab nationalism and Zionism has been exacerbated by the disparity in population growth between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. Zionism's rise has resulted in the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs from their homes and a rise in anti-Semitic sentiment. In the process, Jews saw themselves as a chosen people who embraced Western values, while Palestinian Arabs were viewed as barbaric, and culturally primitive (Atmaca & Süer, 2007).

In 1890, the Arab population in Palestine numbered around 489,000, while the Jewish population was limited to approximately 43,000 (DellaPergola, 2001). Between 1919 and 1926, there was a significant increase in the number of Jews migrating to Palestine (Berry & Philo, 2006), reaching 668,000 Arabs and 84,000 Jews by 1922. Despite the increase in the Jewish population following the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the Arab population in the region continued to outnumber the Jewish population by a factor of two (DellaPergola, 2001). This rapid population change in the region not only affected the demographic, social, and political structures but also created profound ruptures in power dynamics.

Palestinian Arabs have been unable to develop a positive identity until the centralization of the nationalist movement in Palestine. In the First Palestinian Arab Congress of 1919, Palestine was considered as part of Syria, but later, the British Mandate separated Palestine from Syria. The current situation, compounded by Zionist pressures, gave rise to a distinct Palestinian Arab identity. When viewed within the context of Arab nationalism, Palestinian Arabs faced unique challenges, such as Western influences and Zionist pressures, which accelerated the emergence of Palestinian nationalism by leaving them isolated and abandoned. This situation further deepened the identity crisis among Palestinian Arabs. On the other hand, power dynamics, which can be conceived as the overarching concept encompassing political, economic, military, and cultural interactions between nations, possess a complex and multifaceted nature in the Israel-Palestine conflict. The pivotal point of ruptures within these power dynamics can be traced back to the inception of Zionism and the United Nations' proposal in 1947 to partition Palestine (Turkel, 2015).

After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Egyptian President Nasser organized the Palestinians into commando units called fedayeen (Atmaca & Süer, 2007), marking the first concrete beginning of the resistance movement. The spark for armed struggle against Israel in the wake of the Suez Crisis was ignited by Yasser Arafat's leadership of Fatah during the Palestinian awakening. Additionally, in 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was established with the initiative of Egypt to represent the Palestinian people. The Israeli-initiated invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to purge the PLO marked a milestone on the road to the First Intifada on the Palestinian front. The most significant outcome of the Intifada from the Palestinian perspective was the realization that they could resist Israel without the need for any third country. In 2000, Israel's entry into the Haram al-Sharif, regarded as holy by Muslims in Jerusalem, triggered the Second Intifada. Initially, the uprisings began in Gaza and the West Bank, then spread to Israeli territories. In 2003 and 2004, strengthened organizations in the region such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad continued their attacks on Israel (Atmaca & Süer, 2007). The political vacuum created by the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and the significant loss of influence in the occupied territories was an extremely important opportunity for Hamas, which quickly garnered widespread support with its armed resistance approach. In the Second Intifada, unlike the First Intifada, the resistance was carried out not through grassroots organizing but rather through the quasi-state structure of the Palestinian Authority (Keleşoğlu, 2004).

Campbell (1999), underlines that one of the most important reasons why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved is that the expectations of these two different peoples are divergent. From the Palestinian perspective, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been occupied territories since 1967, including East Jerusalem. In this regard, the implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention dated 1949 is essential for the Palestinian people within the framework of measures related to military occupation under international humanitarian law. Israel, however, views the situation from the opposite perspective. Israel refers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "administered territories" and argues that since there is no legitimate sovereignty by force, the Fourth Geneva Convention cannot be applied.

On the other hand, Gaza has a special significance for Palestine and the "Palestinian cause". Gaza is a collective example of Palestinian nationalism. Palestinian independence was declared in Gaza, the fedayeen first appeared in Gaza, the founders of Fatah received their training in Gaza, the first Intifada began in Gaza and Hamas was founded in Gaza. Perhaps most importantly, it was in Gaza that the Palestinian resistance movement withdrew after the first Israeli invasion attempt in

1956-57 (Filiu, 2014). On the other hand, Halliday (2008), points out that after Arafat returned from exile to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1997, he constructed a state within a framework of oppressive and negative Arab nationalism. He emphasizes that Arafat alienated many who supported the Palestinian cause of establishing a state where Palestinians could self-govern in the West Bank and Israel, leaving his people at the mercy of organizations like Islamic Jihad and Hamas.

Besides, since the establishment of Israel, particularly following the expulsion of a significant portion of the Palestinian population, Israeli leaders have endeavored to reject the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism and, concurrently, absolve themselves of responsibility towards Palestinian refugees. This effort has been pursued by emphasizing the existence of a singular small Jewish state amidst a broader region predominantly occupied by Arab states, thereby arguing that the responsibility lies with the Arab states to address the issue within the context of their own states (Tillman, 1979).

On the other hand, Adams (1988) highlights that in addressing the Palestine issue over the past half-century, politicians in the Western world have largely disregarded truth and justice in their actions. Adam emphasizes the unfair dominance of the Jewish lobby in the United States, which often uses its influence in favor of the Israeli state in the Israel-Palestine conflict. With the support of the United States, Adam argues that the manipulation of events has often disregarded the will of the international community, significantly reducing belief in a common solution. This attitude is still evident today, as efforts to create a scenario favoring Israel, where international law is disregarded, are apparent for the whole world to see.

Identities in Conflict and the "Other"

In the Israel-Palestine conflict, identity is a key factor in understanding how both sides define themselves, perceive each other, and act based on these perceptions. The concept of the "other," emphasized by postcolonial theory, is crucial in explaining the relationships between the sides, struggles for sovereignty, and the process of identity construction.

Maynard (2015) emphasizes that all identities are ideological and that ideological differences are often symbolized through identities. In other words, conflicts such as those between the West and Islam or the first and third worlds are

seen as identity labels that encompass ideological and cultural differences. Maynard also suggests that these diverse identities, whether ethnic, national, religious, or otherwise, fuel violence in different ways. Therefore, the difficulty lies in providing a fixed answer for variables such as malleability, dimension, elasticity, etc., concerning ethnic, national, religious, or other identities.

Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007) emphasize that, unlike other explanations that treat power and identity as entirely independent dimensions, power asymmetry interacts with threat perception regarding identity. They also suggest that portraying a foreign country with a similar identity to another country can increase the perception of similarity between the countries, leading to the triggering of positive emotional responses. Harshe (2006) defines the concept of culture as a significant driving force in organizing and constructing the hegemony of a powerful state like the United States. He highlights that cultural factors are influential in shaping the overall appearance of international relations, yet they are difficult to measure. On the other hand, according to Fenton (2011), ethnic groups labeled as minorities often constitute socially disadvantaged groups, leading to a more pronounced manifestation of ethnic differences. Furthermore, Fenton asserts that multiculturalism cannot be limited to a mere opposition to racism and discrimination but needs to be approached in a multidimensional manner. However, this multidimensionality also makes it challenging to implement and sustain. Castles (2011) emphasizes in his article that constructing a multicultural society is not as easy as it is often imagined. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is a type of nationalism that establishes an ethnically homogeneous group of citizens and defines the origins of identity based on shared ethnic, cultural, religious, and ancestry links. A genealogical framework is how ethnic nationalism views the nation (Arman, 2007).

At this point, Jewish national identity was based on distinct religious traditions and the integration of all members of the Jewish diaspora under the umbrella of Jewish culture and ethnicity. From this perspective, the idea of Jews being a separate people from others became influential and continues to be so. In this regard, Israel's historical experience is directly linked to the political and sociological content of its territories and religious laws. A process of nation-building associated with self-sufficiency and strong attachment to the land, identified with Jewish identity and Zionism, has further solidified, forming the basis of Israeli nationalism (Schulze, 1999).

Sayigh (1977) points to five important components in the formation of Palestinian Arab identity. Firstly, they have a distinct history compared to other Arab peoples, which constitutes a significant element in the formation of Palestinian

identity. Secondly, displacement, poverty, oppression, prolonged occupation, and lack of self-determination are crucial factors. Thirdly, the attitudes and treatment of other Arabs towards Palestinian Arabs are significant. Fourthly, the development of identities such as Jordanian and Syrian, shaped around regional regimes and interests, can be identified as other sub-Arab identities. Fifthly, the establishment of the PLO and the rise of the resistance movement are crucial. The positioning of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian cause can be considered a pivotal moment in the construction of Palestinian identity. Lastly, the experiences of Palestinian Arabs' isolation from the world, especially from other Arab regions, and their survival reflexes, constitute the sixth and final component.

On the other hand, Inbari (2017) situates the conflict between Palestine and Israel along three main fault lines: the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Israel-Arab conflict, and finally, the Jewish-Islamic conflict. While the Israel-Palestine conflict is viewed as a national struggle and assumed to be resolvable through an agreement between these two peoples, the Israel-Arab conflict is noted to extend beyond Palestinians to encompass all Arabs and the Jewish-Islamic conflict is often seen as a suppressed awareness. The Oslo process initially addressed the "Israel-Palestine" dimension of this conflict, but later discussions at Camp David expanded beyond this framework. The Oslo Accords, which ended the Arab-Israeli conflict and established mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in 1993, while giving hope for a comprehensive peace worldwide, could not materialize into a lasting commitment (Anıl, 1999). However, these and subsequent agreements have remained ineffective in addressing the ongoing issues. One of the main reasons for this is that the prepared agreements contain ambiguous and double-meaning provisions. This gives the appearance that the agreements were drafted more by politicians than legal experts (Campbell, 1999).

The majority of Palestine, being an agrarian society, consisted of workers and peasants. Additionally, the commonality of religion, language, and culture in the countries where they were refugees posed obstacles to the establishment of Palestinian nationalism. In the 1960s, armed struggle was considered the only solution for Palestine's liberation. Among the most influential groups during this time was the Fatah movement, organized as small guerrilla groups. The First Intifada, which could be considered a natural consequence of a 20-year Israeli occupation, also saved the PLO from extinction as it struggled with exile and internal conflicts. The Oslo Process of 1993, however, fell short of expectations. Edward Said even likened this agreement to the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany by the Allied Powers after World War I, calling it the "Palestinian Versailles" (Keleşoğlu, 2004).

Throughout Middle Eastern history, Arab nationalism has emerged as a response to Western colonial interventions and attitudes, distinct from its inception in response to Zionism's uncertain status in Europe (Joffé, 1983). However, Zionism and Jewish nationalism also constitute another factor in this rupture. The rise of Zionism and anti-Semitism has deeply influenced power dynamics, particularly by fostering the widespread belief that the expulsion of Arabs residing in Palestine had a legitimate basis in the notion that Jews should be the majority in the region. Furthermore, among Jews, there prevailed a belief in their "chosenness" as a people, contrasting with the perception of Arabs as socially primitive and orientally distant from the West, thus reinforcing the idea that Jews represented a structure fully embodying and reflecting Western values (Turkel, 2015).

Edward Said highlights the plight of the Palestinian people who, after losing their lands and being displaced in 1948, continued their lives as refugees and second-class citizens (Gençoğlu, 2023). Said et al. (2004) emphasize that the Palestinians, uprooted to make room for the Jewish people, are the real victims. They also point out that Arabs are condemned to conflicting identities and belongings. Similarly, Frantz Fanon, in his work "The Wretched of the Earth" (2018), considered a manifesto of anti-colonial movements in the postcolonial era, indicates that the West, as the greatest cultural rival of the East, consistently exalts itself while systematically positioning the East and Eastern culture as uncivilized. The concept of the "other," into which Palestinian Arabs are readily situated, stems from this understanding. The West, viewing its dominance over Eastern culture as a responsibility to bring its own values to all societies, perceives the hardships endured in this pursuit as a "legitimate" ordeal. Fanon, highlighting the coexistence of violence and colonialism, underscores how the superiority of the West over the East and the otherness of the East present violence as a legitimate option for the West. In other words, Eastern culture, perceived as the "other" by the West, is seen as a low culture that must be subjugated and clearly distinguished from the West. The Jewish people, positioning themselves as part of the West in actions taken against the Palestinian Arab people, have sought to legitimize these actions through legal motives such as land sales.

Israeli Jews, while attaching illegitimacy to the Palestinian Arab population through labels such as non-peaceful, uncouth, and distant from Western values, savage, and wild, attempt to legitimize their actions and existence based on these descriptions, which seems perfectly coherent with the "other" in the postcolonial perspective. As a result of various persecutions in Jewish history and events such as the Holocaust, security concerns have shaped their mindset, while simultaneously fostering a reflex to continuously portray themselves as victims (Turkel, 2015). As

Zionism's influence grew in the region, tensions escalated between Jews and Palestinian Arab populations. Particularly with the emergence of systematic Jewish land acquisitions, Arabs began attributing insidious and demonic traits to Jews. For instance, during the Nebi Musa uprising in 1920, Palestinian Arabs were incited, chanting slogans like "Palestine is our land, Jews are our dogs." The greatest threat to the Palestinian Arab way of life and livelihood came from these land sales to Jewish workers. This systematic land acquisition triggered hostility and anger within Palestinian society, leading to harsh criticism from Arab politicians and media, accusing those involved in land sales of betraying their fathers' blood and heritage (Segev, 2001).

On the other hand, after a series of military gains such as the Six-Day War, Israel expanded its territories and solidified its presence in the Middle East. Particularly following the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel gained control over the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. During this time, the emerging Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was launching attacks on Israeli targets, had its elements expelled to Jordan (Turkel, 2015). As a result of this war, Israel not only expanded its territory within Palestine but also multiplied its land with the gains against Syria and Egypt. Palestinian Arabs, who perceived the events of 1967 as an injustice that needed to be compensated at all costs, increasingly found any compromise with Israel, which expanded its territories after the war, such as a two-state solution, to be more challenging (Karsh, 2017). Subsequent proposed solutions were insufficient to address the acute asymmetry in Israel-Palestine relations. As of 1991, the economies of the West Bank and Gaza accounted for only 5% of the Israeli economy, and the Palestinian Arabs living under occupation were highly dependent on the lower tiers of the Israeli labor market (Bose, 2007). Framing the Israel-Palestine issue within the context of internal colonialism, as defined by Mitchell and Williams (1978), referencing political and economic inequalities within a state, seems indirectly plausible. Yet, internal colonialism aims to explain a racial or ethnic group's subjugation within the borders of a larger state that is ruled by another group (Chávez, 2011, p. 786).

The current situations and distinctions between Palestinian Arabs living in Gaza, the West Bank, and those residing in Israel are noteworthy. Various economic, political, and social differences exist between Palestinian Arabs living in Israel and those in Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinian Arabs in Israel hold Israeli citizenship and are considered a minority within the Israeli political system. Conversely, Palestinian Arabs in Gaza and the West Bank reside in areas under the control of organizations like Hamas, which are either occupied or under blockade by Israel. Moreover, sharp ideological differences exist between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews,

which may impose certain constraints on Arabs' access to employment, housing, state aid, and Jewish institutions. However, despite these factors, the contribution of the conflict between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews to the Israel-Palestine conflict remains relatively minimal (Smooha & Peretz, 1982). Unger (2008) emphasizes the lack of mutual trust between Israel and Palestine as the missing element in the efforts towards a two-state solution. The challenge of finding common ground between two distinct peoples, continuously struggling to build a homeland within a narrow strip of land under constant occupation, and determined to defend their territory at all costs, is evident in attempts to reach a solution.

Conclusion

The identity of Palestinian Arabs is rooted in a complex relationship between Palestinian nationalism and Arab nationalism. Palestinian Arabs faced challenges within the context of Arab nationalism before forming a distinct identity. Zionism exacerbated the identity crisis of Palestinian Arabs and laid the foundation for the conflict. As emphasized by Edward Said, Palestinian Arabs have confronted the realities of land loss and refugee status, leading to their marginalization and otherization. This otherization has fueled ideological divisions and conflicts between the parties in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Significant military gains such as the Six-Day War have led to Israel's expansion of territories and strengthened its presence in the Middle East. However, these gains have deepened conflicts among Palestinian Arabs and complicated efforts for resolution. The two-state solution faces challenges due to a lack of trust. Economic, political, and social differences between Palestinian Arabs living in Israel and those in Gaza and the West Bank further complicate resolution efforts.

It is possible to argue that Palestinian Arabs living particularly in Gaza and the West Bank serve as a tangible and contemporary example of the "other" in post-colonialism. This is because, in addition to the various underlying factors of the conflict that have been articulated for years, Israel has systematically sought to legitimize its actions by positioning itself as superior to Palestinian Arabs and relegating them to a subaltern identity. The attack carried out by Hamas, designated as a terrorist organization by Israel, towards the end of 2023, ignited a new conflict, resulting in the deaths and injuries of thousands of civilians. Israel's actions, which equally disregard international law in response to Hamas attacks, can be attributed to reflexes that perceive Palestine as the "other" rather than a response to a terrorist attack, undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

The Israel-Palestine conflict traces its roots back to the inception of Zionism and the partition proposal of Palestine in 1947. In 1890, the Arab population in Palestine outnumbered the Jewish population by more than two-fold, but due to the influence of the Zionist movement, Jewish migration increased. This demographic shift created profound ruptures in power dynamics and triggered conflicts between Arab nationalism and Zionism. On the other hand, the identity of Palestinian Arabs appears to have been shaped under the influence of Zionism and anti-Semitism. Throughout this process, processes of othering and struggles for legitimacy have impacted the identity formation efforts of both sides. Palestinian Arabs have endeavoured to preserve their identities by sustaining resistance movements in the struggle for land. The Six-Day War of 1967 and the subsequent historical processes saw Israel expand its territories, deepening mistrust between the parties to the conflict. Proposed solutions have failed to transcend triggering further conflict by emphasizing the asymmetry in Israel-Palestine relations. Israel's economic and military superiority has exacerbated dynamics resembling a form of internal colonialism between Israel and Palestinian Arabs.

Understanding the Israel-Palestine conflict requires an understanding of the relationship between power and identity. Political leaders' disregard for justice has hampered efforts at settlement and prolonged the conflict. The conflict's deep and complex nature is demonstrated by the fault lines that run through its Israel-Palestine, Israel-Arab, and Jewish-Islamic elements. As a result, this emphasizes how complex the Israel-Palestine conflict is, including components related to history, power dynamics, identity, and resolution. This tension is fundamentally caused by power dynamics, identity creation, and historical roots. However, future attempts at resolving the conflict will require the development of mutual trust and the achievement of fair compromises amongst various identities.

Israel's territorial advances since 1967 have had a profound impact on Palestinian identity in addition to having a tangible effect in terms of land staying in Palestinian hands. Palestinian unity and solidarity have become stronger as a result of this process, which has also raised national identity consciousness and resistance. As a result, two significant civil revolt movements (Intifadas) were started. While Israel aims to ensure its security and build its national identity by eradicating threats and fabricating a story that supports its actions, the Palestinians work to shape their identities through the traumas they have endured and the loss of their lands. The Israel-Palestine conflict revealed the idea of the "Other" as a conflict centered on the formation and reconstruction of cultural identities. Language, symbols, and historical

narratives are employed by the sides to the dispute to shape their identity struggles. One way to understand the dispute is as a mirror of the attempts on both sides to create identities. Palestinian resistance groups, on the other hand, may be viewed as an attempt to maintain their identity. The rise of Palestinian resistance organizations can be understood as attempts to uphold Palestinian identity and achieve national independence within the context of the conflict's historical development.

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